Hegel's conception of fanaticism by Llorente, Renzo
Hegel's Conception of Fanaticism 
Renzo Llorente 
State University of New York at Stony Brook 
As an exposition of "natural law and political science in outline," 1 the 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right is nothing if not comprehensive. Even 
so, Hegel's treatise gives rather short shrift to certain topics which we might 
well expect to find treated at some length in a text of this nature. Religion is 
one such topic: Hegel scarcely occupies himself with religious questions in 
the pages of the Philosophy of Right. While unremarkable, perhaps, at first 
glance, the dearth of analysis bearing on religion and its relation to the state 
should give us pause. After all, given the sheer expanse of text devoted to 
the consideration of "Morality" and "Ethical Life" [Sittlichkeit] within the 
work itself and, in addition, the extraordinary political ramifications of 
religious practices throughout history, it would not be unreasonable to 
expect a substantial analysis of "the religious question" from a work of such 
scope and purported systematicity as the Philosophy of Right. This 
expectation is heightened, moreover, by our awareness of Hegel's own 
abiding interest in the philosophical treatment of religion, as well as his 
interest in supplying one of the chief desiderata haunting the legacy of 
Enlightenment thought: a reconciliation of faith and reason. These 
considerations notwithstanding, the fact remains that Hegel's references to 
religion in the Philosophy of Right are few and far between, and tend to be 
of an incidental character at that. 
We do, however, find one striking exception to this neglect in the 
"Remark" appended to section 270, the whole of which consists essentially 
of an extended meditation on one normative question: What relation ought 
to obtain between religion and the state? A complex elaboration of what 
proves to be a momentous form/content distinction, Hegel's reply to this 
question represents the only sustained treatment of religion per se in the 
Philosophy of Right. It should hardly surprise us, therefore, that section 270 
turns out to be the longest single section in the entire work. 
In this paper I propose to examine in some detail the passages 
comprising the "Remark" to section 270, with the aim, first, of clarifying 
Hegel's view of the proper relation between religion and the state (as 
elaborated in the Philosophy of Right) and, second, of shedding some light 
upon a few of the remarkable implications that follow from the conceptual 
approach introduced in his analysis. Accordingly, in the first part of the 
paper I shall summarize Hegel's argument in the "Remark" for section 270. 
Using this account as a point of departure, the bulk of the paper then 
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explores various facets of the very novel and suggestive interpretation of 
fanaticism that emerges from Hegel's reflections on the relationship between 
religion and the state, an interpretation particularly noteworthy, as we shall 
see, as an illustration of Hegel's conception of modernity. Finally, in the 
last part of the paper I shall present a few brief reflections on the 
implications of Hegel's theses for political engagement of religious 
inspiration. 
Hegel begins his argument in the "Remark" for section 270 by recalling 
his concept of religion, which he first evokes in terms of its content. 
Succinctly put, the content of religion is absolute truth and rationality 2 , 
inasmuch as the "concern" of religion, Hegel explains, is "God as the 
unlimited foundation and cause on which everything depends."3 For the 
religious consciousness it is this conception of God that serves as the 
touchstone for the interpretation, judgement, and appraisal of all that exists. 
But truth and rationality, as we learn from Hegel's account of the state, 
likewise comprise its content 4; this identity of content testifies, therefore, to 
an essential kinship between religion and the state. Due to this essential 
kinship, religious institutions and the state can, and should, function as 
complementary forces. And indeed, as "that moment which integrates the 
state at the deepest level of the disposition [of its citizens]," 5 the religious 
disposition ratifies the authority and legitimacy of the state, further securing 
the bond between citizen and state. This aspect of religion proves 
particularly valuable to the state with regard to those citizens who, 
incapable of the requisite philosophical insight enabling one to grasp the 
essential identity of content, could not otherwise achieve recognition of the 
proper relationship between citizen and state. In fact, it is for this very 
reason that Hegel argues that the state ought to require its citizens to 
become members of some kind of religious community. 6 
2 Ibid., p. 292; 299. Cf. Hegel's formulations in the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion: "Religion is divine knowledge, the knowledge that human beings have of 
God and of themselves in God. This is the divine wisdom and the field of absolute 
truth" (G. W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, trans. R.F. Brown et 
al., ed. Peter C. Hodgson [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987], 1, p. 
451). 
3 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 292. 
4 See, e.g., p. 299 of the Philosophy of Right. 
5 Ibid., p. 295. 
6 Ibid., p. 295. In a note appended to the "Remark" for section 270 Hegel 
characterizes this function of religion as a "means to education and the [appropriate] 
disposition" (Ibid., p. 292). For Hegel's claim that an appreciation of the identity of 
content demands "philosophical insight" see p. 299. 
HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF FANATICISM 85 
At any rate, while a religion or church may well fail to serve the 
interests of the state in this fashion and may even attempt to sever every 
connection to the state (as we shall see below), no religious community can 
claim total independence, or a total exemption, from the jurisdiction of the 
state. To the contrary, insofar as the members of a religious community 
embark on wordly enterprises (e.g., actions intended to give concrete 
expression to doctrinal commitments) they find themselves within the 
purview of the state, for worldly enterprises require that one give objective 
expression to one's will and, as we know from the analysis of Abstract 
Right, only by means of property does the will assume an objective form. 7 
Any assumption of property, however, immediately brings one within the 
state's jurisdiction. It is with the appropriation of property, then, that the 
religious community "emerges from the inner realm into that of wordly 
affairs and hence into the province of the state, thereby placing itself 
immediately under its laws." 8 
As noted, religion and the state have the same content; there would 
seem to be no reason, then, for a religious community to refuse the state the 
attention and respect—and voluntary obedience—which it demands. 
However, if it is true that religion and the state possess an identical content, 
this content assumes distinct forms in each. This distinction of form 
determines their essential difference, and consequently accounts for the 
possibility of conflict between church and state. 
The formal difference between religion and the the state derives from 
distinct relations to the Absolute and their corresponding forms. Again, the 
object of religion is absolute truth and rationality, but it has this object only 
"as a given content whose basic determinations have not been recognized in 
terms of concepts and thought."? Insofar as its relation to the Absolute 
subsists as this merely given content, a content "in the form of feeling, 
representational thought, and faith*"10 the religious consciousness of the 
It should be emphasized that Hegel's proposition is not simply a prescription of 
opium for the people. It is not his view that the state should encourage its citizens to 
assume some affiliation with a religious community merely so that, concerned 
exclusively with an otherwordly fate, they view worldly affairs with indifference, 
seeking neither to influence the state's policies nor intervene in their execution. 
Rather, he believes the state should encourage affiliation with a religious group 
because religion, if "genuine"—and we shall see presently just what "genuine" 
denotes for Hegel—strengthens one's adhesion to the state. Whether in the end this 
amounts to practically the same thing is a separate question and one that I cannot 
pursue here. 
7 See, e.g., section 46 of the Philosophy of Right. 
8 Ibid., p. 296; cf. p. 299. In fact, for Hegel religious communities constitute a 
variety of corporation; such is their "official" status vis-a vis the state and for this 
reason alone they remain, in the last analysis, subject to the state's laws. 
9 Ibid.. p. 299. 
•0 Ibid., p. 293. 
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Absolute lacks the conceptual clarification and determination peculiar to the 
products of philosophical cognition. The state, on the other hand, has 
knowledge-, that is to say, its content bears the form of determinate thought 
and rationality. 1 1 Still, this formal difference alone does not entail any 
necessary antagonism. Rather, antagonisms between church and state arise 
from doctrinal contradictions. 
The doctrine of a given religious community, we know, consists of the 
body of tenets and beliefs held by the community, the creed that informs 
and distinguishes its religious orientation and practices. By contrast, the 
state's doctrine is to be understood, for Hegel, as consisting in what it holds 
as "valid in relation to right" in accordance with determinations of objective 
rationality, and it appears "in the form of thought as law." 12 We find one 
manifestation of this formal distinction in the fact that religious doctrine is 
treated primarily in inwardness, whereas the state's doctrine necessarily 
achieves objective expression in the law. (One consequence of this 
distinction, important for some of the problems to be treated below, is that 
because religious doctrine belongs essentially to inwardness, because it has 
its province within the conscience and therefore enjoys what Hegel calls 
"the right of the subjective freedom of self-consciousness," 13 the state is 
never entitled, whatever the circumstances, to dictate or otherwise interfere 
with a religion's doctrine.) 
Now, a religious community's doctrine may prove generally compatible 
with that of the state, or the two doctrines may be antithetical to each other; 
yet even a contradiction between the two doctrines need not necessarily 
engender conflict between a religious community and the state. This 
contingency depends on whether or not members of a religious community 
content themselves with the religious form of consciousness as such when 
they turn to the realm of society at large and the operations of the state. For 
while the form of religious consciousness is in itself inadequate to proper 
cognition of the ethical status of the state, the members of a religious 
community can transcend the one-sidedness of their convictions acquired in 
the immediacy of subjectivity. By "raising their subjectivity to cognition of 
the truth and knowledge of objective right and duty," they come to 
understand that "ethical relations are essentially relations of actual 
rationality"14, and hence are the province of the state, whose primacy in this 
11 Ibid., p. 299. The "Addition" to section 270 states the same distinction as 
follows: "The Idea, within [the context of] religion, is spirit internalized in emotion, 
but it is this same Idea which...in the state...secures an existence [Dasein] and 
actuality for itself in knowledge and volition" (Ibid., p. 303). 
12 Ibid., p. 297. 
13 Ibid., p. 297. 
1 4 Ibid., p. 294; p. 296. More generally, this task belongs to "the momentous 
transition of the inner to the outer, that incorporation [Einbildung] of reason into 
reality which the whole of world history has worked to achieve" (Ibid., p. 294). Cf. 
Hegel's comments in his "Preface" to the Philosophy of Right: "But if it is the right 
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regard is to be confirmed and endorsed by the church's adherents in 
inwardness. Church members who achieve this cognition freely submit to 
the authority of the state, and their religious commitment serves the proper 
auxiliary function of religion vis-a-vis the state mentioned above. 
The real source of antagonism and conflict between religion(s) and the 
state derives from the "shapes" that religious belief assumes when a 
religious community fails to assimilate the cognition of objective right and 
duty to its religiosity in representational form—whatever the specific 
doctrinal character of the latter. Such communities or churches typically 
proclaim "religious advice [that] attempts to retain exclusive validity and 
claims authority to determine and administer [the process of] right."15 In a 
word, these religious communities fail to recognize the limitations inherent 
in immediate cognition and content themselves with the first form of 
religious consciousness alone, "renounc[ing] cognition of objective t ru th" 1 6 
altogether. In contrast with the religious devotion of a "genuine" kind 
which, having complemented its subjective religiosity with an embrace of 
the state's rationally determined principles, freely submits to the latter's 
authority and jurisdiction and so issues in practices in harmony with it, the 
communities whose doctrine remains at the level of representational thought 
assume a negative attitude toward the state; to the extent that they aspire to 
actualize their doctrines, these communities clash with the state. This 
thoroughly negative attitude toward the state, which Hegel terms "polemical 
piety", can follow one of two courses, assuming one of two expressions of 
repudiation. Either believers attend to their doctrine exclusively in 
inwardness, adopting an attitude of indifference toward the state, or they 
attempt to externalize their doctrine in the domain of rational objectivity, 
and so mount a direct challenge to the state. In both cases (i.e., with both 
types of polemical piety) the religious community betrays its impoverished, 
merely representational view of the state as an institution designed simply to 
safeguard property rights, security, general welfare, e t c . 1 7 , a view that 
wholly ignores the preeminently ethical character of the state and its 
indispensability as a framework for the realization of freedom. 
As an exclusively inward disposition the negativity of polemical piety 
generates a detachment from the perceived affairs and operations of the 
state. Church members so disposed display a passive acceptance of the 
kind of piety, it abandons the form of this [emotional] region as soon as it emerges 
from [the condition of] inwardness into the daylight of the Idea's full development 
[Entfaltung\ and manifest abundance, and it brings with it, from its inner worship of 
God, a reverence for the laws and for a truth which has being in and for itself and is 
exalted above the subjective form of feeling" (Ibid., p. 16). (As one might suspect, 
the series of remarks in the "Preface" from which this citation is drawn only 
becomes fully intelligible in light of section 270.) 
•5 Ibid., p. 291. 
Ibid., p. 294. 
>7 Ibid., p. 298. 
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State: they do not directly challenge the state's authority, but nor are they 
willing to embrace or assist i t . 1 8 When, on the other hand, such a 
communi ty ' s adherents at tempt to impart objectivity to their 
(representationally conceived) doctrine in defiance of the state, this attitude 
becomes fanaticism. 
Where fanaticism prevails, representational thought likewise prevails. 
Decisions bearing on actual existence are based on mere opinion; 
expressions of arbitrary will and merely subjective representations replace 
the objective determinations of the state. Concerned exclusively with the 
content of religious consciousness, fanaticism "repudiates all political 
institutions and legal order as restrictive limitations [Schranken] on the 
inner emotions and as incommensurate with the infinty of these . " 1 9 Hence 
the hallmark of fanaticism—"haired of law, of legally determined right."20 
Animated by a form of consciousness which knows only absolute 
abstraction, 21 fanaticism strives for a universality without determinacy, and 
thus an annihilation of the differences established by the state and preserved 
in its laws, a radical de-differentiation and homogenization. 
What policy should the state assume toward these negatively disposed 
religious communities and their adherents? According to Hegel, this 
depends on which type of repudiation is involved. On the one hand, the 
state must tolerate "polemical piety" when this takes the form of 
inwardness, i.e., insofar as the religious community abstains from efforts to 
impart objectivity to its convict ions . 2 2 When, however, a negatively 
disposed church or religious community claims authority in the purview of 
the state, that is to say, whenever there arises a threat to objective truth and 
the rational principles governing Ethical Life, the state must turn intolerant, 
asserting its supremacy to ensure "the right and form of self-conscious, 
objective rationality." 2 3 The state has a duty to be intolerant of opinions 
1 8 In one of the notes attached to section 270's "Remark" Hegel refers to the 
Quakers and the Anabaptists as examples of this sort polemical piety (Philosophy of 
Right, p. 29S). At any rate, in one sense persons of such a disposition are, to be sure, 
not really members of the state at all, for they disdain to recognize the validity of the 
state's laws, and so recognize no duties to the state either. Still, insofar as they 
possess and dispose of property they enter the state's domain and therefore incur 
certain obligations to it. See p. 295 of the Philosophy of Right. 
19 Ibid., p. 293. 
2 0 Ibid., p. 279. 
2 1 Ibid., pp. 37-38. It is in section 5 of the Philosophy of Right that Hegel treats this 
aspect of fanaticism in some detail, in the course of discussing the first moment of 
the will, "the element of pure indeterminacy" (Ibid., p. 37). 
2 2 The duly of tolerance, Hegel adds, presupposes both that the state is secure 
enough and strong enough to exercise such tolerance, and that the negatively 
disposed religious communities remain small in number. Too large a number of 
citizens who accord the state merely passive obedience would, like fanaticism, tend 
to undermine the state's actuality. See p. 295 of the Philosophy of Right. 
2 3 Ibid., p. 299. 
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based on bad principles when these principles aspire to "give themselves a 
universal existence [Dasein] which undermines ac tua l i ty . " 2 4 When 
confronted with this threat it behooves the state to exercise what we might 
call its epistemological sovereignity, as ultimate arbiter of objective truth 
and the "right and form of self-conscous, objective rationality." For it is by 
upholding the objective determinations of the laws that the state defends 
particular interests as well as the "rights of r e a s o n " 2 5 and objective 
rationality. We may then think of the state's intolerance toward fanaticism 
as in one sense representing an exercise of raison d'etat, one which finds its 
justification in the reason of the state. 
In sum, insofar as it must practice intolerance toward the designs of 
certain religious communities the state is merely fulfilling its essential 
purpose: the conservation and harmonization of particular interests 
(including those of every variety of religious group) within the universal 
interest. 2 6 Thus, however curious Hegel's neglect of the religious question 
in his analysis of Civil Society or the Family, it is clear why he should 
choose to broach the relationship between religion and the state precisely 
he re , 2 7 in a section stressing the state's two-fold role as the institution that 
secures the universal interest while upholding particular interests. 
In concluding this brief exposition it is well to take note of the decisive 
inversion, as it were, that Hegel effects in the course of section 270. Hegel 
begins his discussion in the "Remark" by way of responding to the claim 
that the state rests on a religious foundation. We have seen why, according 
to Hegel, this cannot be so: the mode of understanding natural to religious 
insight and conviction is that of representational thought, feeling, the sphere 
of opinion—"a subjective content which therefore has no true inner force 
and power . " 2 8 Yet Hegel's counterargument goes further still, and by the 
end of his analysis it has been shown that, far from the state's resting on a 
religious foundation, "genuine" religion—in the end the only worthy type 
of religion—rests on a political foundation.™ It is not the state that cannot 
2 4 Ibid.. p. 301. 
2 5 Ibid.. p. 292. 
2 6 Ibid., p. 290. Cf. p. 282: T h e principle of modern states has enormous strength 
and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the 
self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, while at the same time bringing it 
back to substantial unity and so preserving this unity in the principle of subjectivity 
itself." 
2 7 In a note to the "Remark" for section 270 Hegel does in fact directly acknowledge 
the absence of a more extensive treatment of religion, explaining that "a 
comprehensively concrete treatise on the state" would include such a discussion, but 
that in the Philosophy of Right it is "the principle of the state which is expounded in 
its own distinct sphere and in accordance with its Idea...." (Ibid., p. 292). 
2 8 Ibid., p. 301. 
2 9 It is no doubt instructive to recall that Hegel himself claims, in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, that "religion is the foundation of the state" (1,472; cf. p. 
200 of the Lectures: "...the state must rest essentially on religion"). Yet the context 
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do without religion, but religion that cannot do without the state, at least in 
this crucial respect: if it is to render itself "genuine," a religious community 
must integrate its own devotion with an understanding and affirmation of 
the state's ethical authority, and to this end it is dependent on the existence 
of the state. To be sure, the state benefits from the endorsement of religion, 
which endorsement lends further legitimacy to the state's authority. 
Nevertheless, in the end the state does not require this endorsement because 
it enjoys its own "religious accreditation," owing to the fact that its laws 
embody rationally determined ethical principles which have been "framed 
with reference to" religion. 30 
* 
Having reviewed the substance of the "Remark" to section 270, let us 
now return to one of the most interesting aspects of Hegel's analysis, namely 
his interpretation of the phenomenon of fanaticism. References to 
fanaticism appear on two different occasions within section 270, once in the 
course of the "Remark" itself and once in the context of the "Addition" 
derived from Hotho's notes. In addition, Hegel discusses the problem in the 
"Remark" and "Addition" to section 5 as well as in a footnote to section 
258, the second of the sections relating specifically to the nature of the state. 
From these comments explicitly addressing fanaticism, and the thrust of his 
discussion of the relationship between religion and the state generally, we 
can distill a fairly coherent conception of the nature of fanaticism.3' 
of these remarks suggests that such statements should be interpreted as an 
affirmation, as in the Philosophy ofRight, of the essential identity of content uniting 
religion and the state; that is, the fact that for Hegel, "religion and the foundation of 
the state are one and the same—they are implicitly and explicitly identical" (Ibid., p. 
452). At any rate, it is clear that Hegel's criticism in section 270 of the Philosophy 
of Right is aimed at those who assert a foundational role for religion while failing to 
comprehend the meaning which "foundation" and "religion" must have if this 
assertion is to reflect the insights of philosophical cognition. 
30 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 299. Of course in another sense none can do 
without the state: "Since the state is objective spirit, it is only through being a 
member of the state that the individual [Individuum] himself has objectivity, truth, 
and ethical life" (Ibid., p. 276). Cf. the "Addition" to section 261: "The 
determinations of the will of the individual acquire an objective existence through 
the state, and it is only through the state that they attain their truth and actualization" 
(Ibid.. p. 285). 
It is worth noting, in addition, that another inversion of sorts also takes place in 
the course of section 270, in that Hegel's analysis underscores the fact that it is not 
the Church that is an end in itself, but rather the state. Cf., e.g., p. 297 of the 
Philosophy of Right. 
31 Although my account of Hegel's conception of fanaticism is based soley on the 
Philosophy of Right, it is well to note that the references to fanaticism in the 
Philosophy of Right are consistent with the few scattered remarks on this theme 
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How, then, should we interpret fanaticism according to Hegel? To 
begin answering this question it is useful to recall Hegel's remarks on the 
nature and status of the law. The key passage in this regard is doubtless 
section 211, wherein Hegel elucidates the connection between Right and the 
law. In this passage Hegel shows that Right assumes the form of 
universality and determinacy only when established as law, for it is by 
means of laws that cognition of the principles of Right in their determinate 
universality are rendered objective. The state's laws therefore establish and 
codify objective determinations, that is, they confer objective existence on 
Right in itself as determined by thought rather than feeling. Truth appears 
in universal yet determinate form, Right becomes positive Right, through 
the l a w s . 3 2 
As embodied in institutions and codified in law, then, positive Right 
fixes particular determinations, and thus limitations. But such 
determinations and limitations remain utterly foreign—and inimical—to the 
mere immediate cognition corresponding to religiosity in the form of 
representational thought, or an apprehension of Absolute Truth that has not 
been supplemented by the ethical principles established through rational 
cognition. This abstract form of consciousness, the cognitive basis of 
fanaticism, as it were, reflects the infinity of inwardness, the state of 
found elsewhere in Hegel's corpus. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 
for example, Hegel likewise speaks of fanaticism in connection with the elevation of 
an individual end to the status of a universal end: "A real purpose of this kind first 
appeared in Islam, where the singular purpose is raised to universal purpose, and so 
becomes fanatical" (Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, II, p. 438). 
Similarly, in The Philosophy of History Hegel equates fanaticism with a devotion to 
an abstract thought which negates the existent and so necessarily issues in the 
destruction of the concrete. Referring to the religious history of the Moslems, Hegel 
states that "their object was, to establish an abstract worship.... This enthusiasm was 
Fanaticism, that is, an enthusiasm for something abstract—for an abstract thought 
which sustains a negative position towards the established order of things. It is the 
essence of fanaticism to bear only a desolating destructive relation to the concrete..." 
(G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J Sibree [New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 19S6], p. 358). In keeping with the view informing this last 
remark, Hegel moreover identifies "Arabia" as "the empire of fanaticism [das Reich 
des Fanatismus]" (Ibid., p. 100). 
3 2 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 294; 241. In section 211 Hegel furthermore 
distinguishes between a legal code which exists by virtue of convention, and as such 
is "merely a collection" of customary rights, "characterized by formlessness, 
indeterminancy, and incompleteness," and the legal code "proper," in which "the 
principles of right in their universality, and hence in their determinacy, are 
apprehended and expressed in terms of thought" (Ibid., p. 242). Insofar as even a 
legal code proper "may differ in content from what is right in itself," the discrepancy 
is due, explains Hegel in section 212 of the Philosophy of Right, to the fact that 
"being posited constitutes the aspect of existence [Dasein] in which the contingency 
of self-will and of other particular factors may also intervene..." (Ibid., p. 243). 
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"absolute abstraction or universality" corresponding to the first moment of 
the will (treated in section 5 of the Philosophy of Right), whose essential 
nature manifests itself in a negative freedom, a "pure indeterminacy...in 
which every limitation, every content...is dissolved." 3 3 It is the "formalism 
of unconditional subjectivity," 3 4 which not only knows nothing of, but in 
addition resists, the restrictions that the determinations and limitations 
generated by rational cognition entail. 
Thus, by acting on and attempting to render objective the merely 
subjective representations of this one-sided religiosity, fanaticism in effect 
seeks to establish the objectivity of a doctrine that remains in the form of 
representational thought; indeed, fanaticism is the necessary result of such 
an undertaking. It necessarily wills abstract representat ions, all 
particularizations proving incompatible with the essential indeterminacy of 
representational thought. Like this form of consciousness, fanaticism 
strives to encompass everything within an undifferentiated totality; it 
represents a force that strives for homogeneity and seeks a coerced 
unification, identity, sameness. Hence fanaticism's pretensions to de -
differentiation and homogenization noted above. Though, to be sure, 
fanatics will a positive state of affairs, their exertions can only take the form 
of a nullification of already existing particular determinations, for the 
positive ethos which they envisage amounts to an order of minimal 
differentiation and, in any event, it is only by means of destruction that the 
"negative" will at the source of fanaticism attains to self-consciousness and 
achieves its self-affirmation. 3 5 Consequently, fanaticism tends to a radical, 
wholesale de-differentiation of the particular determinations established by 
reason in history and secured in modernity through the objective protection 
of laws that recognize and safeguard these determinations. For this reason 
the definition provided in the "Addition" to section 270, while perhaps 
ultimately unreliable, may yet best epitomize fanaticism: "fanaticism is 
simply the refusal to admit particular differences." 3 6 
Not surprisingly, this disdain of difference(s) appears most strikingly in 
fanatics' repudiation of all laws, whose intent is, as we have seen, to secure 
and preserve determinate differences. In lieu of law, fanaticism would have 
subjective feeling "legislate." Accordingly, if and insofar as judgements 
and decisions bearing on wordly affairs must be made, subjective 
representations, caprice of arbitrary will, and opinion will prevail for, as is 
observed in the "Addition" to section 270, "inwardness does not develop 
3 3 Ibid., p. 37. 
3 4 Ibid., p. 301. 
3 5 Ibid., p. 38. 
3 6 Ibid., p. 304. The "Addition" to section 5 of the Philosophy of Right cites the 
French Revolution's Reign of Terror as an illustration of this will to de-
differentiation, since the institutionalization of the Terror meant that "all differences 
of talents and authority were supposed to be cancelled out [aufgeltoben]" (Ibid., p. 
39). 
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reasons ." 3 7 Rationality will be entirely absent from fanaticism's 
judgements, for while they, like the laws, possess universality, they lack 
determinacy. 3 8 
One noteworthy consequence of conceiving fanaticism in these terms is 
that it enables us to appreciate more fully the fundamentally anti-modern or 
pre-modern impulse that inspires the fanatic and sustains her enterprise. As 
fanaticism's challenge to the state represents at bottom a challenge to what 
Hegel calls "the architectonics of [the stale's] rationality", 3 9 it amounts to 
nothing less than a repudiation of the distinctively modern essence of the 
state. Moreover, this rejection of the state constitutes but one element of a 
repudiation of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit)—a definitively modern articulation 
of social life—as such. For fanaticism shows itself no less averse to 
particular determinations within the other spheres of Ethical Life, not to 
mention the differentiation of the spheres themselves (i.e., the Family, Civil 
Society, the Slate). Consider, for example, fanaticism's attitude toward 
Civil Society. As we are reminded in the "Addition" to section 182 Civil 
Society, like Ethical Life generally, comprises an irrcducibly modern 
creation, it being the modern world "which for the first time allows all 
determinations of the Idea to allain their r ights ." 4 0 Yet the pretensions of 
fanaticism also endanger this peculiarly modern creation, owing to its 
repudiation of the determinations of particularity embodied in "the 
relationships and tasks of civil society, etc. [which it rejects] as unworthy of 
love and the freedom of feeling." 4 1 Rejecting both the determinations 
within the distinct spheres of Ethical Life themselves and the determinations 
which underpin the differentiation of these spheres, fanatics strive 
ultimately for a negation of Sittlichkeit as a whole, the totality of Ethical 
Life qua a "rational system of social institutions." 4 2 
But if in the end Hegel's analysis succeeds in illuminating the anti-
modern or pre-modern impulse of fanaticism it is because in treating 
polemical piety (including its expression in fanaticism) in particular, and the 
relationship between religion and the state in general, he brings to bear his 
concept of modernity. Although the scope of this paper does not allow for 
an adequate treatment of this dimension of Hegel's method, let us at least 
note that he bases his condemnation of fanaticism essentially on the laltcr's 
tendency to contravene the central principles of his concept of modernity, 
3 7 Ibid., p. 304. 
3 8 Cf. Hegel's remarks in the "Preface": 'That right and ethics...arc grasped by 
means of thoughts and give themselves the form of rationality—namely universality 
and determinacy..."(/,/i//o5o/?/i3' of Right, p. 17). The distinction drawn in the text 
corresponds to some degree to Hegel's distinction between a dc facto legal code and 
legal code proper. See note 31 above. 
3 9 Ibid.. p. 15. 
4 0 Ibid., p. 220. 
41 Ibid., p. 293. 
4 2 Allan Wood, "Editor's Introduction" in Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. xii. 
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namely the principle of subjectivity or autonomy (i.e., the peculiarly modern 
freedom for individuation and self-determination, the freedom of 
particularity), and the insistence on justification and legitimation by 
reason. 4 3 As we have seen, fanaticism would annul the freedom of 
autonomous subjectivity by abrogating the very determinations which 
establish the institutional conditions of this freedom. With respect to the 
imperative of rational justification, it suffices to recall that Hegel's whole 
critique of fanaticism rests at bottom on the contention that religion, loo, 
requires justification by reason; ultimately it, too, must assimilate the 
objective ethical determinations wrought by the operation of rational 
thought. Likewise, Hegel ultimately condemns fanaticism for its deficit of 
rationality. 
At any rate, to conclude our discussion of fanaticism, let us take note of 
two implications, or corrolarics, of this aspect of Hegel's theory, and two 
problems which it seems to leave unresolved. The first of these 
implications has to do with the singularity of Hegel's criterion for 
determining the "genuineness" of religious devotion. As noted above, 
Hegel's thesis provides us with a means for distinguishing belween proper 
and improper types of piety, between "genuine" and "polemical" modes of 
religiosity. Again, a genuine religion acknowledges and endorses the stale, 
having raised its subjectivity "to cognition of the truth and knowledge of 
objective right and duty" and thereby come to recognize the ethical 
character of the state and its necessary supremacy. For Hegel, a religious 
community's practice is "genuine" to the extent that it combines its 
subjective religiosity of the understanding with a recognition of the 
objective rationality of the stale, and so voluntarily subordinates itself to, 
and ratifies the authority of, the latter. 
Leaving aside for the moment the fact that, by positing this criterion, 
Hegel ends up affirming only those religions which endorse the modern 
slate without reservation, we may note that Hegel's view implies that the 
doctrine of almost any religious group can be rendered "genuine," 
regardless of its specific doctrinal content, provided only thai it is raised to 
"cognition of the iruth and knowledge of objective right and duty." This 
means, however, that Chrislianity, the "religion of freedom" 4 4 itself and the 
4 3 Statements of, and allusions to, these principles occur repeatedly in the 
Philosophy of Right. For especially prominent references to the "principle of 
subjectivity," see for example sections 124, 162, 185,260,299, and 316. Regarding 
the insistence on justification and legitimation by reason, consider Hegel's remarks 
in his "Preface": "It is a great obstinacy, the kind of obstinacy which docs honour to 
human beings, that they are unwilling to acknowledge in their attitudes [Gesinnung] 
anything which has not been justified by thought—and this obstinacy is the 
characteristic properly of the modern age..." (Ibid., p. 22). (Cf. section 132: "The 
right to recognize nothing that I do not perceive as rational is the highest right of the 
subject..." (Ibid., p. 159). 
4 4 Ibid., p. 303. This formulation appears in the "Addition" to section 270. 
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decisive impetus behind the advent of modernity (due to its cultivation of 
subjectivity), cannot justifiably lay any special claim to "genuiness"; rather, 
its adherents also bear the responsibility for supplementing their immediate 
cognition of the truth with the objective determinations of rational 
thought—it, too, remains susceptible of anti-modern regressions, it too must 
become "genuine". 
The second point that I wish to underscore is the following: One virtue 
of Hegel's analysis is that it shows why religious fanaticism is necessarily 
political in nature—indeed, is by definition a kind of political fanaticism. 
By showing that an externalized polemical piety tends of necessity both to 
dispute the state's authority and contest its very existence, Hegel provides a 
most plausible argument for the inevitably political character of religious 
fanaticism. 
As for the various problems attending the interpretation of section 270, 
I should like to mention two, without however, venturing to resolve them. 
First, it is worth noting that it remains unclear whether Hegel regards 
fanaticism as being fundamentally an aberration of the individual or a supra-
individual disorder. In other words, does the potential for fanaticism 
represent an institutional liability, or is it rather merely the result of a failing 
on the part of the individual believer? To be sure, the menace of fanaticism 
is in large measure proportionate to the number of fanatics, but nevertheless 
the question remains: Who bears the responsibility for integrating the 
ethical and juridical determinations of rational cognition with the religious 
form of consciousness, the individual or the community? 
Hegel does of course often treat the issue of polemical piety in terms of 
"religious communities" or simply "the Church", and the general tenor of 
his interpretation implies that the responsibility for integrating religious 
insight with the concepts of rational cognition lies with the community. 
Yet, if it is the case that this responsibility docs fall to the community, how 
are we to explain the persistence of individual fanatics within one which has 
duly integrated its own doctrine with that of the state? In a similar vein, one 
must question the efficacy of assimilating and affirming the determinations 
of objective rationality at the level of the religious community, considering 
that fanaticism originates in the form of consciousness natural to religious 
conviction in the individual. On the other hand, the assumption that every 
individual adherent of a given faith or member of a given religious 
community bears responsibility for assimilating the rationally determined 
ethical principles to her or his conviction leads to two problems: first, it 
makes for an undue measure of contingency in the performance of this vital 
task; secondly, it seems to suppose greater intellectual capacities of 
individuals than Hegel is prepared to grant: It will be recalled that Hegel 
believes that all citizens should be required to affiliate themselves with 
some religious community or other, presumably because most citizens 
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cannot by their own lights recognize the true authority of the state, and their 
proper relation to i t . 4 5 
The second problem to which I wish to draw our attention concerns the 
issue just mentioned, namely Hegel's suggestion that the state encourage all 
of its citizens or subjects to belong to some religious community, since the 
religious sentiment strengthens and lends further legitimation to the state's 
authority. Hegel maintains that any religious community will do, and that 
the state is therefore under the obligation to observe a policy of strict non-
interference with regard to the content of religious doctrines. Now, it is well 
to ask whether Hegel's proposition does not produce a certain tension in his 
treatise, a tension symptomatic in many ways of the tension between the 
liberal and communitarian tendencies in his treatment of the relationship 
between religion and state, and his political thought generally. Given 
Hegel's theory of the state and in particular his concern with the conditions 
ensuring its viability and sovereignty, we may well wonder how he can 
advocate such a broad religious liberty. For, if some religious doctrines not 
only do not tend to reinforce the state's legitimacy, but, to the contrary, of 
necessity tend actively to contest it, is it advisable that the state nonetheless 
authorize their propagation? By doing so does the state not encourage—or 
in any event, fail to discourage—polemical piety? Does the state's 
responsibility to safeguard rationality, i.e., to uphold the rights of self-
conscious objective rationality, 4 6 not entail some obligation to discourage, 
if not stem altogether, (he growth of "polemically" oriented tendencies of 
religious piety? Is it enough, as a countermeasure, that the state promote 
(through, for example, educational practices) all individuals' receptivity to 
its own rationally determined ethical and juridical principles? These are, it 
seems to me, questions that must be addressed if we truly wish to make 
sense of the implications of this facet of Hegel's political theory. 
* 
Lastly, I should like to consider the implications of Hegel's conception 
of polemical piety for political engagement or praxis of religious 
inspiration. As we have seen, according to Hegel's thesis it is in principle 
impossible for a "genuine" religion to propound, let alone endeavor to 
realize, a doctrine at odds with the slate's doctrine. (Indeed, since "the 
organization of the [modern] slate is inherently [in sich] rational and the 
image of eternal reason," 4 7 any opposition to ils structural constitution is 
irrational—and hence alien to "genuine" religious devotion—by definition.) 
Does Hegel's view not, therefore, foreclose the possibility of progressive 
4 5 It is after all "philosophical insight which recognizes that Church and state are not 
opposed to each other as far as their content is concerned...but merely differ in form" 
(Ibid., p. 299; first emphasis added). 
4 6 Ibid., p. 299. 
4 7 Ibid., p. 306. Cf. p. 380: "the state [is] the image and actuality of reason." 
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praxis or engagement by religious communities in the modern era? If all 
positive exertions of a religious community that are at variance with a 
modern state's juridical or institutional structuration arc tantamount to 
"fanaticism", how is religion to perform a progressive political function? Or 
docs Hegel's political theory simply preclude the possibility outright? In a 
word, does the relationship between religion and the state affirmed by Hegel 
amount to a prescription for acquiescence and servility, and therefore 
simply lend further credibility to the view that Hegel advocates capitulation 
before the status quo? 
It is difficult not to conclude that Hegel's theory of the modern state 
does to a large extent deny the legitimacy of such religiously inspired 
dissidence. Yet we must bear in mind that even if this much is granted, it 
applies only in the case of modern states, and that even many states existing 
in the modern era would not qualify as modern states according to Hegel's 
criteria. For this reason it is worthwhile to examine the possible 
implications of Hegel's view with respect to pre-modern states. 
What, then, are the implications for religiously motivated political 
engagement in those historical contexts where neither the state nor religion 
yet posseses a rational form? That is to say, what, on Hegel's terms, would 
be the proper relationship between religion and the state before the rise of 
the modern state? Again, both church and state rightly claim the status of 
an ethical authority in the modern era, but the two do not possess equal 
authority: the modern state enjoys ultimate ethical authority, and this 
hierarchy of ethical authority is due to the state's rational supremacy, the 
result of its rational form. But what of the past? What view would Hegel's 
theory imply for the past? To be sure, the religiosity of polemical piety was 
no more "genuine" in the past, yet it is equally true that before the modern 
era the state lacked the one quality, its objective rationality, which in the 
modern era establishes the basis for its ultimate supremacy as an ethical 
authority. 
In short, it would seem that in the past religious communities and the 
state bore the same content, without cither possessing a rational form. 
Presumably, then, both sorts of institutions were entitled to the same ethical 
authority. But if this is so, then it would seem that insofar as, or wherever, a 
given state has yet to become rational, has yet to attain the actuality of the 
properly modern state, religion and the state represent the same ethical 
status, at least gauged in formal terms. 
What does this imply with regard to polemical piety? Might it not 
perform a progressive function when the state exists in a less than rational 
form? Might not polemical piety represent a progressive dialectical 
counter-force wherever it reacts against a repressive positivity, 
understanding the latter as, in Habermas's words, "a society from whose 
historically petrified forms the spirit has fled, a society whose institutions, 
laws and constitution no longer correspond to interests, opinions, and 
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sentiments" 4 8 ? Might not the decidedly pre-modern (and anti-modern) 
impulse of religious fanaticism have an essential role to play in pre-modern 
contexts—the role, paradoxically enough of a modernizing agent? Indeed, 
it seems plausible to infer, given the assumptions of Hegel's theory in the 
Philosophy of Right, that polemical piety, in both of its forms, was a 
necessary force in the past, a vital factor at one stage in the evolution of 
world history and the progressive actualization of the Idea, which finds its 
consummation in the modern state. If this is so, then we may rightly speak 
of even a necessary and legitimate fanaticism in the past, operative in the 
phases of world history prior to the full rationalization of the state, prior, 
that is, to a time in which modernization characteristically implies 
secularization. Whether manifested as a withdrawl into inwardness or as 
the outwardly directed response of fanaticism, such polemical piety would 
on this interpretation constitute one pole of a dialectical antagonism 
promoting and propelling the development of reason. In fact, we find some 
warrant for this interpretation in the "Remark" to section 270 itself, when 
Hegel alludes to 
past...periods and conditions of barbarism in which all 
higher spirituality had its seat in the Church, while the state was 
merely a secular regime of violence, arbitrariness, and passion 
and the abstract opposition [of Church and state]...was the main 
principle of actuality....49 
Of course, Hegel docs not discuss any concrete historical examples of 
fanaticism qua a progressive, antagonistic counter-force to the pre-modern 
state. By way of conclusion I should like to suggest that the case of Jesus 
Christ furnishes us with just such an example; that we might well regard 
Jesus as a paradigmatic cxamplar of such, as it were, progressive polemical 
piety. After all, given Hegel's conception of fanaticism, Jesus appears as an 
exemplary, even archetypal fanatic, the fanatic par excellence, repudiating 
as he did "all political institutions and legal order as restrictive 
limitations...and hence also rejcct[ingl private property, marriage, the 
relationships and tasks of civil society, e tc . , " 5 0 and exhorting his adherents 
to do the same. Indeed, paradoxical as it may sound, the very inspiration for 
4 8 Juergen Habermas, Theory and Praxis, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1973), p. 180. 
4 9 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 298. In this connection Hegel's remarks on the 
autonomy of Socrates in section 138 of the Philosophy of Right arc also pertinent. 
5 0 Ibid., p. 293. Jay Haley underscores this very feature of Jesus's activity in his 
study of Jesus as a charismatic leader of an incipient mass movement. Jesus's 
recruits, Haley writes, "had to give up everything related to ambition in the society 
as it was and abandon all other commitments to others, including family tics, when 
they joined him" (Jay Haley, The Power Tactics of Jesus Christ and Other Essays 
[New York: Avon Books, 1971 J, p. 40). 
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the "religion of freedom" and foundation of modernity counseled and 
embodied the most potent antagonism to the conditions of (modern) 
freedom, by virtue of his fanaticism. In any event, if we grant the 
assumption that social progress and the advance of World Spirit required 
polemical piety, including fanaticism, in the past, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that Jesus's fanaticism was of this type and pardonable, even 
laudable, on these grounds. That Hegel's analysis affords us such insight, 
enabling us to appreciate Christ's political significance as the protagonist of 
a world-historical fanaticism, is but one more unexpected virtue of the 
Philosophy of Right. 
